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Abstract
This paper evaluates the short-term impact of Thailand's 'Million Baht Village Fund' pro-
gram, among the largest scale government microfinance iniative in the world, using pre- and
post-program panel data and quasi-experimental cross-village variation in credit-per-household.
We find that the village funds have increased total short-term credit, consumption, agricultural
investment, income growth (from business and labor), but decreased overall asset growth. We ,
also find a positive impact on wages, an important general equilibrium effect. The findings
are broadly consistent qualitatively with models of credit-constrained household behavior and
models of intermediation and growth.
1 Introduction
We study the impacts of Thailand's Million Baht Village Fund Program, a large-scale government
intervention that acted as an exogenous injection of potential funds into 77,000 heterogeneous Thai
villages' The program was among the largest scale government microfinance initiative of its kind.
Each transfer of one million baht (about $24,000) was used to form an independent village bank
for lending within the village. Every village, whether poor or wealthy, urban^ or rural, was eligible,
and all sixty four villages for which we have panel data did indeed receive the funds. The size of
'The Thai program involves approximately $1.8 billion in initial funds, or about 1.5 percent of Thai GDP in 2001.
This injection of credit into the rural sector is much smaller than Brazilian experience in the 1970s, which saw a
growth in credit from about $2 billion in 1970 to $20.5 billion in 1979. However, in terms of a government program
implemented through village institutions and using micro-lending techniques, the only comparable government pro-
gram in terms of scale would be Indonesia's KUPEDES village bank program, which was started in 1984 at a cost of
S20 million and supplemented by an additional $107 million in 1987. (World Bank, 1996)
'The village (moo ban) is an official political unit in Thailand, the smallest such unit, and is under the sub-district
{tambon), district (amphoe), and province [changwat] levels, respectively. Thus, "villages" can be thought of as just
small communities of households that exist in both urban and rural areas.
the transfers were substantial. Across our sample, the transfers averaged twelve percent of total
annual income in the village economies, and forty-one percent of total short term credit flows.
We view each of these transfers as a smaller, though substantial, version of the broader increases
in financial intermediation, which have been well studied at the macro-level.'* A criticism of some
of this literature is that intermediation is endogenous. But here, for us, village capitalization has an
important degree of exogeneity making them "test tube" -like experiments for studying phenomena
important to macro-economies, including general equilibrium effects. More specifically, two crucial
elements of the structure of the Million Baht program gave the transfers this (plausible) exogeneity.
First, the program was a rapidly introduced "surprise" policy initiative. In November 2000, the Thai
Parliament was dissolved, and by January 2001, the populist Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra
was elected. The new policy was implemented quite rapidly. None of the survey villages had
the village banks in the 2001 data, but all had them by the 2002 data. Second, there is strong
variation in the intensity of the credit injection in the cross-section of villages. Specifically, each
village received the same amount - one million baht - regardless of the population of the village,
so smaller village economies received a relatively more intense injection of credit. For example, the
million baht transfer injection averaged 27 percent of income for the lowest quintile (i.e., smallest)
village economies, and less than 2.5 percent for the top quintile (i.e., largest) village economies.
We use an interaction of the year of the program introduction and the number of households
in a village as instrument for the amount of credit received and the probability of receiving credit.
We believe that this variation in credit driven by variation in the inverse number of households
per village in the post-program years is exogenous. A priori we know that most of the variation
in inverse number of villages is among small villages (i.e., between 50 and 250 households), and
indeed ex post our results are robust to the exclusion of the few large (and very small) villages
that are not in this range. Second, villages are geopolitical administrative units, and it is not
uncommon for villages to be split for administrative purposes. Finally, while the crucial instrument
is the additional interaction of inverse village size during the program years, village size itself is
not significantly related to the levels or growth of credit or other the outcome variables. That is,
after controlling for household characteristics, villages look very similar in terms of their levels and
growth rates until the program is instituted.
Earlier influential work by King and Levine (1993) establishes correlations between growth and private sector
intermediation. Rajan and Zingales (1996) is an attempt to establish causality. Aghion et al (2005) models the non-
linear relationship between financial intermediation on convergence. Townsend (2009) gives a very detailed analysis
of the Thai experience of growth with increased financial intermediation.
It is also important to keep in mind that each village we consider is in many ways its own small
economy. The village economies are open economies, but not identical and not entirely integrated
with one another and the rest of the broader economy (nearby provinces, regions, etc.). It matters
where a person lives. There is substantial variation in institutional and market arrangements
across villages (Townsend, 1995). Certainly informal borrowing and lending within the village is
more common than across village lending, and there is cross village variation in interest rates and
the amount of credit.'' Even labor markets are not entirely integrated with local wages varying
considerably across villages.^ Finally, risk sharing may vary. The household-specific fixed effects
we use attempt to control for much of this heterogeneity, but because village are small (quasi-
open) economies, we anticipate movements in quantities and prices that vary with the size of
intermediation.
^
', ^
The Townsend Thai dataset we use has unique advantages. It contains seven years (1997-2003)
of panel data on 960 households across 64 villages in four rural and semi-urban provinces of Thai-
land. These data include information on education, assets and investment, income, borrowing and
saving through various forms, consumption, occupation, and household composition, for example.
The first five years of data give us a "before" picture of the environment, while the final two years
give us the ability to look at the effect of the program on levels and growth rates of relevant out-
come variables. The relatively short "after" horizon gives us a window for examining the impacts
of credit on villages, at a time when these impacts were still localized. (Indeed, neighboring village
impacts constructed using GIS techniques are small and typically insignificant.) A smaller monthly
panel with only 16 villages has separate information on labor supply and wage rates.
Our regressions use short-term village fund credit as a measure of treatment and assess its im-
pacts on households, including those running small businesses. The major impacts we examine are
the effect of the new village institutions on (other and total) credit, saving and investment deci-
sions, consumption, asset growth, income and income sources, wage rates, and business enterprise.
We run two-stage regressions with household-specific fixed effects using both levels and changes in
levels as the dependent variables. AdditionaUy, we control for observable household characteristics
(i.e., household composition, age and education of household head) and add year-specific dummy
"The ratio of the number of loans to relatives within vs. outside of the village is 2:1, for non-relatives this ratio
is 3:1 and interest rates are much lower on within-village loans. Small loans are less likely between households in
different villages. (Kaboski and Townsend, 1998)
°For each village in Thailand, we have a reported average wage in the village from the Thai Community Devel-
opment Department. Among the four provinces (changwats) we examine, the within-province coefficient of variation
in average daily wage across villages ranges between 23 and 41 percent.
vaxiables.
1.1 Findings in Light of Theory
Our analysis is motivated by two broad classes of theories on credit constrained environments. The
first class of models is the buffer stock savings model of households in the presence of borrowing
constraints and income uncertainty, modified to include investment. The households in Thai villages
we study faced relatively low average returns on liquid savings relative to returns on capital and
face limited borrowing. Default is not uncommon (average credit in default is about 12 percent of
average income). Our companion paper, Kaboski and Townsend (2008), uses the same Thai Million
Baht intervention to estimate an exphcit structural model of household decisions: consumption;
low-yield liquid savings held as a buffer against income shocks; high-yield, illiquid, and indivisible
investment projects; and default. In contrast, this paper uses reduced form regression methods to
delve more deeply into the details of consumption, investment/business, and credit decisions.
Many of the findings here are broadly consistent with such an interpretation.
First, the availability here of credit increased total borrowing, and so crowding out of or substi-
tution away from other sources was not a major issue. Indeed, we cannot reject the null hypothesis
that credit increased one-for-one with the injection of available credit. At the same time, average
interest rates on short-term credit did not fall, but rather rose slightly. This can be viewed as
evidence that households were originally credit constrained, since credit increased even though in-
terest rates did not fall. Thus, similar to Banerjee and Duflo (2004), we see that households are not
merely substituting toward lower cost credit or expanding borrowing in response to lower borrowing
costs. Among the purposes and types of credit that increased were credit for consumption, credit
for agricultural investment, and credit from the agricultural bank and perhaps commercial banks
as well.
''.•-.. .'!-;.
^
...
. .
.
' :'.. "' ' ^^ -:..- ' ,.
Second, total consumption increased substantially, perhaps one for one with credit, which indi-
cates credit constraints are particularly binding in consumption decisions. The magnitude of such
an increase in consumption could not be explained in a permanent income model. Credit would
at most have a wealth effect, and consumption responses would be bound by the interest on this
wealth effect (e.g., seven percent). The results are consistent with buffer stock models, however,
where the ability to borrow has large effects on consumption both by impacts on the consumption
behavior of currently constrained borrowers and also on those with the potential to borrow in the
future.^ The composition of consumption increases is also of interest. Grain, tobacco, ceremony,
and educational expenditures were stable, but credit increased expenditures on household and auto
repair, fuel, meat, dairy goods, and alcohol. The more typically income elastic components of
consumption or those with an intertemporal element (Uke repairs) responded the most to credit.
The increase in fuel usage and auto repairs is consistent with Karlan and Zinman (2008)'s findings
for payday loans in South Africa.
The prevalence of households in default rose in the year of repayment, and households defaulted
on short-term credit. In the bufferstock model in our companion paper, increased borrowing,
particularly for consumption, can increase the probability of future default. (The model also
produces a decline in default in the initial year of the program, which can be observed using
year-specific coefficients.) The use of informal credit was apparently unaffected by the program,
however.
The second broad class of models motivating our analysis are models of macro-intermediation,
entrepreneurship and growth (e.g., Lloyd-Ellis and Bernhardt, 2000, Greenwood and Jovanovic,
1990, Banerjee and Newman, 1993, Buera and Shin, 2008, and Buera, Kaboski, and Shin, 2008).
Such models have been shown to perform relatively well in fitting the long run Thai growth expe-
rience (see Gine and Townsend, 2004, Jeong and Townsend, 2003, and Townsend and Ueda, 2006,
forthcoming), some with endogenous financial deepening and some with an exogenously expanding
credit sector. In these models, improvements in intermediation on the extensive and/or intensive
margin can spur business or agricultural investments and growth in business income. Improve-
ments in intermediation can also have indirect impacts via changes in wage rates or relative prices
of tradables and non-tradables.
The imphed connection between access to finance, entrepreneurship, and growth is often a
central motivation for microfinance programs as poverty alleviation interventions. Microfinance
programs typically cater to poor people who lack access to other forms of intermediation in the
hope that the poor are financiaUy constrained and have high returns to investment. Women, in
particular, are often targeted under the belief that they have less access to credit, lower outside
options in the labor market, and therefore the highest returns to private entrepreneurship.
The results here under a quasi-experimental intervention are mixed with regards to the predic-
tions of these models. On the one hand, we indeed measure significant increases in income growth
"The fact that informal credit and household lending did not respond, however, indicates that relending to non-
borrows, as in Angelucci and De Georgi (2006), is not a major issue.
and a change in the composition of income as a result of the intervention. As the models would
predict, business and labor market income tended to increase, while agricultural income from crops
other than rice tended to decline. We also find increases in total payments to labor. On the other
hand, business and labor income did not seem to be driven by the extensive margin of investment
and business starts themselves. To the contrary, we find no change in business starts or business
investment, and assets actually decline in response to the program. We do see an increase in the
frequency of agricultural investments, but a reduction in the use of fertihzer, and, again, agriculture
overall declines as a fraction of income.
A few potential explanations are suggested by the data. First, the structural model in our
companion paper provides a quantitative explanation for why impacts on investment levels may
be difficult to discern in the sample size we analyze. Investments are lumpy and infrequent, and
so the distribution of realized investments is highly skewed. Second, households report both in-
creased labor income and higher payments to outside laborers in response to the program. Perhaps
credit was most useful as working capital, allowing businesses and farms to hire more laborers and
potentially use more intermediate inputs. That is, perhaps it is the intensive margin, and access
to working capital, rather than fixed entry costs that most constrain households in their business
activities. McKenzie and Woodruff (2006) offer complementary evidence that fixed costs in Mexico
are negUgible, yet they find high average returns. Their experiments in Sri Lanka (McKenzie and
Woodruff, 2008) also find high returns to increases working capital among entrepreneurs. A third
possibility is that credit offers consumption-smoothing, cashflow management, and/or limited lia-
bihty, which, for a given level of investment, can change the composition of investment and labor
decisions toward higher risk but higher yield sources of income a la Greenwood and Jovanovic
(1990) and Braverman and Stightz (1986). Indeed, the buffer stock model of our companion paper,
predicts a decline in low return liquid assets (along with a move toward high return investment).
Evaluating this conjecture on the composition of investment is difficult, however, since measuring
second moments of returns on disaggregated investments is non-trivial. - ,
Another implication of the macro-intermediation, entrepreneurship and growth models is the
general equilibrium effect of intermediation on wages. Intermediation can lead to an increase in
wages because of increased investment and productivity increases from a higher quality pool of
entrepreneurs, which lead to an increased demand for labor. Gathering experimental evidence
for such mechanisms is clearly difficult, but the sheer scale of the Thai Million Baht intervention
together with labor markets that are fairly segmented across villages allow us to discern impacts
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on wages. We find that wage rates increased for some occupations (general non-agricultural labor,
construction in the village, and other), but not for occupations outside of the village.
1.2 Existing Literature on Microfinance
A microfinance initiative is a natural financial intervention to examine because of its policy rele-
vance. Over the past twenty years, "microfinance" has become a key word among both researchers
and policymakers in development economics. Initiatives are sponsored by a variety of organiza-
tions, including the World Bank, United Nations, USAID, national governments and many chari-
table NGOs. There are an estimated 120,000 microfinance initiatives worldwide, and the number
is growing. A growing literature has arisen to evaluate such programs.
The advantages of this study relative to previous work on microfinance interventions are es-
sentially four-fold. First, the program is unique because of size of the intervention is large and
its consequent policy importance. A key policy question in the evaluation of smaller microfinance
programs is the extent to which they can be scaled up for larger scale poverty reduction, or whether
large scale increases in credit availability might hamper the programs (Duflo, 2004, World Bank,
2004). Second, as stated earlier the size of the intervention and the segmented credit and labor mar-
kets yield general equilibrium effects both within, and potentially beyond, the village economies.''
General equilibrium impacts of credit programs may be important for large scale programs, and
identifying these impacts at the micro-level also gives potential insights into the micro-mechanisms
behind macro-theory. For example, enhanced credit may increase investment and employment,
potentially moving the wage rate. Microevaluations have great difficulty identifying general equi-
librium effects. Third, we have data on households and small enterprises, and the relevant variables
necessary to consider potential channels of impact in an environment of local, household-level in-
vestment and occupational choice decisions. Finally, the program design produced a convincing,
exogenous instrument for evaluation. Our exogeneity has both a cross-sectional and timing element,
which is important since impacts may vary over time.
Of course, our paper contributes to an existing literature that includes many of four advantages
above, though not simultaneously. Karlan and Zinman (2008) study a true controlled experiment
in which a financial institution randomized loan decisions on consumer loans to wage-earners. Pitt
and Khandker (1998) study the Grameen Bank, using cutoff participation requirements as an in-
' In principle, aggregate (economy-wide) general equilibrium effects would not be identified by our methods. How-
ever, since the general equilibrium impacts we find do not seem to extend to neighboring villages (see Section 3.3),
we don't think that general equilibrium impacts at an even wider scale are a major issue over time span we examine.
strument. They have a cross-section, larger than ours, with four outcomes: labor supply, child
schooling, female assets, and expenditure. The amount borrowed is quite large relative to expen-
ditures per household. Pitt et al. (2003) studies the same program, but examines biometric health
outcome measures. Burgess and Pande (2005) also study a big program, but it is an expansion
of banks over twenty years differentially across regions in India. Their outcomes are macro level
poverty headcount and wage data. Coleman studies much smaller NGO lending in Thailand using
a smaller dataset of about 500 people, but with a great variety of variables. He has a set of villages
with programs and a set that will receive them in the future. This is a fairly good control, but there
is no exogeneity in the timing of how long the program has been used. He has a panel with four
survey rounds in one year, so he examines high frequency but only short-term effects. Gertler et al.
(2003) study BRI in Indonesia to see if microfinance helps insure against shocks to health. They
have an instrument with less clear exogeneity (proximity to financial institutions), but also a fairly
large panel data set (the IFLS). Banerjee and Duflo (2003) study firm's borrowing from banks but
not household borrowing. Aportela (1998) looks at the expansion of bank branches and argues it
is exogenous. In any event it is a smaller expansion, and he looks only at savings behavior. Finally
our results complement the results of Banerjee, Duflo, Glennerster, and Kinnan (2009), who use
experimental data in India. They find sizable income effects on owners of existing businesses but
increases in consumption for households not in business.
Clearly, the exogeneity of our instrument (the inverse number of households in a village inter-
acted with program years) is a critical argument in our analysis. We present a priori justification
for its exogeneity in Section 2, which also discusses the program and data in more detail. Section
3 lays out our methods, explicitly states our exogeneity assumption, and gives empirical support
for the exogeneity of the instrument. Section 4 then presents the results, while Section 5 concludes
and gives direction for future research. '
,
,
2 Description of Program and Data
We provide an overview of the Million Baht Village Fund, including its quasi-experimental imple-
mentation, and then describe the data.*
This overview is based on data from the institutional panel data set, as well government materials and informal
interviews of village funds committee members, Community Development Department (CDD) officers, and Bank for
Agriculture and .Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC) officers and administrators in March, 2002. BAAC administrators
were interviewed in Bangkok, while three branch officers, a CDD officer, and six village fund committees were
interviewed in Buriram, Chachoengsao and Chiangmai.
2.1 Overview of Million Baht Progr2Lm
The fund was a key program in Prime Minister Thaksin's election platform. The primary hope was
that the money would be a revolving, self-sustaining fimd to be used for investments in occupational
development, employment creation and income-generating activities. The official stated objective
for the program was to improve the economic and social status of villagers, and to enable villages
to be less dependent on government aid in the future. It was also promoted as an attempt to reach
the underprivileged, develop a decentralized grass roots approach to growth, and link communities
with government agencies and the private sector.
The program was funded by the central government. While it is difficult to know precisely how
the program was funded, it clearly entailed a substantial transfer from Bangkok to rural areas in
line with the populist goals of the government. For example, the households in the rural areas pay
little to no taxes.
The transfers were given to the villages with both carrot and stick provisions to encourage
sound management and repayment of loans. The stick involved telling villages that if the funds
were abused or the village institutions failed, they would be offered no further assistance, and
even other sources of government funding would be cut off.^ The carrot was the promise to turn
the successful village funds into true village banks. That is, the Thai Bank for Agriculture and
Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC) later offered loans to villages that receive their highest rating.
Their hope was that the funds would assist them in providing financial access to rural communities.
These additional loans were first made available after the period of study in this paper, however.
2.1.1 Organization and Founding •
The program was jointly administered by multiple government agencies. In the rural and semi-
urban areas we study, the BAAC received the initial money transfer and held both the lending and
savings accounts for the village funds. ^^ Officers from the Community Development Department
provided oversight and guidance, as they do with other village funds. Local teaching colleges were
in charge of conducting audits of the village funds as well as an evaluation of the funds and member
households. These audits are in addition to the BAAC's own fund ratings mentioned above. ^^
This threat was not completely credible, which is especially clear since Thaksin is now deposed, but based on
interviews it seemed to at least be an important issue to villagers.
' Each village fund holds two accounts, the first for receiving the million baht transfer and the second for holding
member savings. When a loan is granted by the village fund, the member takes a form signed by committee members
to the BAAC, and the loan amount is transferred from the fund account to the individual account.
''We, the authors, tried to assist BAAC officials in the development of this rating system.
In order to receive funds, villages needed to form committees, develop policies^^, submit an
application/proposal for the village fund, and have the proposal evaluated^ '^ and accepted. The
vast majority of village households became members of the village funds and village funds averaged
94 members.^'' The committees were selected democratically by the villagers at a village meeting,
with regulations set up to ensure fairness of these elections. ^^
Although a federal program, the village funds themselves are only quasi-formal, in the sense
that they have no building or facility and no employees. ^^ They are administered at the village
level by a committee^^ elected by the village and by occasional meetings of all villages. Such quasi-
formal village institutions are typical in Thailand (see Kaboski and Townsend, 2005). One villager
is appointed as an accountant/bookkeeper, and the accounting is fairly detailed, including dated
records of all loans, payments, deposits and withdrawals.-'*
2.1.2 Policies
Some savings and lending policies were stipulated, while others were set by the villages themselves,
often based on the suggestions from printed materials or suggestions from CDD officers.
''Government agencies provided villagers with informal advice and manuals describing the goals, procedures and
regulations of the village funds. In addition, the appendix contained an example of the policies of a village fund.
Although these policies were shown as an example, from interviews, it appears that many committees felt that these
suggested policies were fixed regulations for all funds.
' The applications in our survey villages were submitted to the BAAC and evaluated first by an district (amphoe)
level sub-committee with final approval from the national fund committee. The evaluation criteria included: the
selection of the fund committee; the qualification of the fund committee including its knowledge, experience and
management ability; the policies and regulations of the fund; the extent of participation of villagers and members in
the funds management; and the compliance with fund regulations.
'"Any adult could be a member, so many households had multiple members. The primary membership criteria
for most institutions was to live in the village. For those households that weren't members, they typically did not
want to borrow and two reasons were often given: either the households were wealthy and did not need the money
or wanted to leave the funds for poorer households, or the households were poor and did not want to get into more
debt.
''The village meeting required 75 percent of households in the village for a quorum. By regulation, the committee
needs to consist of 9 to 15 villagers, with half of them women. Requirements were that committee members be at
least 20 years old, have lived in the village for at least two years, be a person of good character (e.g. no gamblers or
drug users), not be bankrupt, never have been imprisoned or have violated position or property, not have been evicted
from the government or a state enterprise, have maintained the right to vote, and never have been evicted from the
fund committee. Committee members can serve a maximum of two years with half of the committee members being
replaced each year.
"'According to the sample regulations, committee members were by regulation allowed to divide ten percent of the
fund profits among themselves as compensation for their work. Few of the funds surveyed compensated committe
members, however.
''While a general meeting of fund members is required to take place at least once a year, only 85 percent of the
funds interviewed reported having these general meetings. The committee plays the primary administrative role in
the fund and typically reported meeting one to two times a year to evaluate loan applications.
Instruction manuals of accounting procedures were provided by various government agencies. These manuals were
roughly 50 pages, and while groups noted that the accounting was tedious, complicated and difficult, none claimed
that it was unmanageable.
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For lending, the fund was typically divided into two portions: 900,000 baht for investment,
and 100,000 baht for an emergency fund.^^ According to the institutional survey, village funds
lent out on 950,000 baht in the first year, and according to the household data lending increased
about ten percent from the first to the second year. In order to ensure equal access to the funds,
regulations stipulated a maximum loan size of 20,000 baht.-" Loans above this amount require
approval by all members of the fund, but loans were not supposed to exceed 50,000 baht (about
$1100) regardless. Less than five percent of loans exceeded 20,000 baht, but we do observe four
households with loans exceeding 50,000). The repayment period could not be set longer than one
year. In addition, villagers claim that they were required to charge a positive rate of interest on
loans, and interest rates varied from two to twelve percent, with an average nominal interest rate of
seven percent. Another suggested policy that was generally adopted was the use of two guarantors
for loans, though the number of guarantors required ranged from one to eight across the sixty-
four institutions.-^ Only eleven of these institutions required collateral, and only three had fully
collateralized loans. Repayment was quite high. According to the household data, using a 90-day
definition, less than three percent of village fund credit lent out in the first year was in default in
the second year.
Committee members typically were to decide who receives loans. The evaluation of the loans
included the members' ability to repay, the appropriateness of the investment, and the amount
requested. Given the small loan sizes, institutions made a large number of loans, and a large
fraction of households received loans. About 55 percent of households received loans from the
village fund in our sample.
Seventy percent of the village funds also offered savings services, with most of these requiring
that members save and make pledged deposits into their accounts. Members' savings are jointly
held in a separate (individual) BAAC savings account. One suggested set of savings regulations
that was often followed was that all members must pay an application fee, and buy at least one,
but not over 20 percent of shares in the fund. Another suggestion was pledged savings funds with
the following policies; deposits are made on a given date, pledged amounts varying from 10 to 500
baht across members, and pledge amounts able to be changed once a year. The average nominal
interest rate on savings was just 0.5 percent, that is, a negative real interest rate. The total stock of
' Many funds claimed this was a requirement of the program, but again it appeared to only have been an element
of the sample village fund regulations.
- About 35 percent of all loans are of this maximum size.
' Other suggested policies that were often adopted: a late payment penalty of 0.5 percent per day and a duration
for emergency loans that was less than one year.
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initial savings averaged about 4000 baht across funds. Some funds lent out member savings, while
others limited the limited loans to the initial transfer.
2.2 QuEisi-Experimental Design of the Program
As described in the introduction, the program design was beneficial for research in two ways. First,
it arose from a quick election, after the Thai parliament was dissolved in November, 2000, and was
rapidly implemented in 2001. None of the funds had been founded by our 2001 (May) survey date,
but by our 2002 survey, each of our 64 village had received and lent funds, lending 950,000 baht on
average. Households would not have anticipated the program in earlier years. -^ Second, the same
amount was given to each village, regardless of the size, so villages with fewer households received
more funding per household. Regressions below report a highly significant relationship between
household's credit from a village fund and inverse village size in 2002 after the program.
There are strong a prion reasons for expecting this variation in inverse village size in the years
of the program to be exogenous with respect to important variables of interest.
First, villages are geopolitical units, and villages are divided and redistricted for administrative
purposes. These decisions are fairly arbitrary and unpredictable, since the decision processes are
driven by conflicting goals of multiple government agencies. (See, for example, Pugenier, 2002 and
Arghiros, 2001). Data for the relevant period are unavailable, but between 2002 and 2007 the
number of villages increased by three percent, while since 1960 the number of villages increased by
roughly 50 percent. _ .:.'•• . • ,,
Second, because inverse village size is the variable of interest, the most important variation
comes from a comparison among small villages (e.g., between 50 and 250 households). Indeed, we
focus our baseline estimates on these villages, but show that results are quite robust to including
the whole sample. That is, our analysis is not based on comparing urban areas with rural areas, and
we are not picking up the effects of other policies biased toward rural areas and against Bangkok.
Third, village size is neither spatially autocorrelated, nor correlated with underlying geographic
features like roads or rivers. Figure 1 shows the random geographical distribution of villages by
decile of village size over the four provinces (Chachoengsao, Lopburi, Buriram and Sisaket) in the
year 2001. The Moran spatial autocorrelation statistics in these provinces are 0.019 (standard
' Although villages did received the funds in different months of the year, the precise month that funds were
received is uncorrelated with the amount of credit per household after controlling for village size.
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error of 0.013), 0.001 (0.014), 0.002 (0.003), and 0.016 (0.003), respectively.^^ Only the Sisaket
autocorrelation is statistically significant, and the magnitudes of all of them are quite small. For
comparison, the spatial autocorrelation of the daily wage in villages ranges from 0.12 to 0.21. We
also checked whether village size was correlated to other underlying geographic features by running
separate regressions of village size on distance to nearest two-lane road or river (conditioning on
changwat dummies). The estimated coefficients were 0.26 (standard error of 0.32) and -0.25 (0.24),
so neither was statistically significant. Small villages did tend to be located closer to forest areas
however, where the coefficient of 0.35 (0.03) was highly significant, indicating that forest area may
limit the size of villages. ^^ Nonetheless, these regressions explain at most five percent of the
variation in village size, so the variation is not well explained by geographic features. We have
included roads, rivers, and forest in Figure 1.
Finally, since we control for both village size and household level fixed effects, any contamination
would need to result from village size capturing changes in the outcome variables over time, which
is doubtful. We verify in Section 3.4 that village size is unrelated to pre-existing differences in levels
or trends of the variables that we examine.
2.3 Data
As stated in the introduction, our data are panel survey data from the Townsend Thai dataset.^^
We utilize five years (1997-2001) of data before the onset of the program and two years (2002-
2003) of post-program data. We focus on two components of the survey (the household data and
the institutional data), and supplement the data with information gathered in informal interviews
conducted in the field. In addition, we corroborate some of the findings in a parallel monthly
longitudinal survey.
The household panel data set is a stratified, clustered, random sample, including 15 households
in each of 64 villages distributed across four provinces {changwats) of Thailand - the changwats of
"'The general formula for Moran's statistic is:
En r—^7i ,
ELX;.-A ELEL(--)^
where n is the number of observations (villages), z, is the statistic for observation i (village size of village i), and
«),_, is the weight given villages depending on their spatial distance. Here we use inverse cartesian distance between
villages.
"''Forest conservation efforts have driven some redistricting decisions but these decisions have been largely haphazard
and unsystematic. For discussions, see Pugenier (2001) and Gine (2005).
"'See Townsend, et al. (1997).
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Chachoengsao and Lopburi in the Central region relatively near Bangkok, and Sisaket and Buriram
in the poorer Northeast region. ^^ The attrition rate from year to year averaged only three percent
annually so that, of the 960 households surveyed annually, 800 of them were followed for the full
seven years. Attrition was largely due to migration.
The household data set has several strengths. First, it is the only panel data from Thailand that
spans across the pre- and post-program years. Second, the data is exceptional in its breadth and
level of detail. These data include information on education, assets-^'' and investment, income and
expenditures in production, borrowing and saving through various forms, consumption, occupation,
businesses operated, and household composition, for example. Using credit as an example of the
detail in the data, for every year we have a record of all loans, both formal and informal, that
a household has taken. These loans include the amount of the loan, date of the loan, duration,
amount to be repaid, interest rate, lender, stated reason for borrowing^'^ , collateral used, value of
collateral, whether the loan has been repaid, and the consequences of defaulting on the loan. The
lending environment in these villages is very nuanced, with the BAAC, commercial banks, family, ,
relatives, money lenders, and other quasi-formal village institutions in addition to the village funds
all playing significant roles. -^
The panel data also include an institutional component which surveyed all of the quasi-formal
micro-financing institutions encountered in the survey villages over the seven years of data: the
founding; membership, saving, lending, and default policies; and the organizational structure and
financial relationships of the institutions. These data are the source of many of the descriptive
statistics given above. The survey data also include the record books of the institutions themselves,
which is used to compare households' borrowing to institutions' lending in a village. The 64 "million
baht" village funds were first in the survey in 2001, but other smaller village funds pre-date the
The survey design was based in part on the results of prior field research in the Northern region (see Townsend,
1995).
"'The initial 1997 value of real assets is found by depreciating the purchase price of the asset (in 1997 baht) from
the time of purchase to what it would have been worth six years ago. We assume that the depreciation rate for
all household and agricultural assets is 10 percent per year. One exception is land, the value of which we do not
depreciate over time.
The retrospective wealth levels are incomplete in (at least) two respects. The first issue is that we only have
information on household and agricultural assets that the household still owns. The second concern is that we do
not have any information on past financial assets and liabilities. Fortunately, financial assets and liabilities tend to
make up a small fraction of current household wealth, and so were probably also a small fraction of past wealth.
Subsequent asset levels were found using current investment data and a depreciation rate of ten percent.
" Variables measuring the amount of credit borrowed for different purposes are based on these reported reasons for
borrowing.
"'See Kaboski and Townsend (1998)
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million baht funds. '^'' '.:','') ; '. .— •;[::'.''.'- ^ •' y ,,,:, ."'l
Table 1 gives summary statistics for the relevant variables of the annual household data used
in this paper. - . ,
,
The monthly panel is a smaller panel of 400 households in 16 villages that differ from the
annual panel data, but are drawn from a common survey in 1997 in the same changwats. Despite
the monthlj' panel being a much smaller sample and creating many issues involving timing because
of its high frequency, it has strengths that complement the annual data. In particular, the monthly
data includes not only income, but separate records for labor supply (measured in days), which
allow for daily wage rates by activity to be calculated.
Finalljr, we use data from the Community Development Department (CDD), which includes all
villages in our provinces, for our geographic analysis.
3 Methods
In dealing with the data, we focused on the effects of village funds on short-term credit (defined as
loans of one year or less). The vast majority of village fund credit was short-term, and so we wanted
to see its impact on the short-term credit market and abstract away from other credit markets. If
long term credit were included, credit variation caused by one household taking out a long-term
mortgage on a large home might be too large, swamping any effects of village fund credit that could
otherwise be observed.
The dependent variables we focus on are divided into four categories:
• First, we measure the impact of the village fund credit on the short-term credit market,
including: its effects on total short-term credit; borrowing from other formal sources (i.e., the
BAAC and commercial banks); the stated reasons for borrowing (i.e., business investment,
agricultural investment, fertilizer/pesticides, an consumption); and measures of the tightness
of credit markets (interest rates, default and informal borrowing).
• Second, we measure the effect of village fund credit on consumption and its different com-
° Consumption is non-durable in that it excludes household asset expenditures, and includes only food, drink,
fuel, clothing and services. Consumption is measured by a solicitation of 13 disaggregate items that best predict
aggregated non-durable consumption expenditure in the larger more comprehensive SES survey. In practice 50-80%
of the variation can be explained by these 13 items. A price index for each of the four provinces was created by
the average price of the inter-quartile, 25-75% range of purchases and sales of the key consumption items for which
both quantities and values were recorded. Given the weights on each component, impacts on the component of
consumption do not simply sum to the total impact (see Table 5).
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ponents. Specific components include grains, dairy, meat, fuel, clothes, home repair, vehicle
repair, eating out, tobacco, alcohol (consumed both in and out of the home), ceremonies, and
education.
• Third, we assess the impact on the income and productive decisions of households. In par-
ticular, we look at overall asset and income growth, the sources of both net income (agricul-
ture, business, and wages/salaries), investment (agricultural and business), input use (fertil-
izer/pesticides), and sources of gross agricultural revenues. We also look at wage rates and
days worked.
• Fourth, we look at differential impacts on the above variables in female-headed households.
Microcredit is often targeted toward women, and theory (e.g., Bourgignon, et al., 1994, Brown-
ing and Chiappori, 1998) and evidence (e.g., Pitt and Khandker, 1998, Kaboski and Townsend,
2005) suggest that impacts may differ across men and women.
We propose the following specification for the impact of short-term village fund credit {VFCRn,t)
of household n at time t on outcome measure yn^f-
yn,t = Yl "'^''.".« + PVFCBn,t.,t
i=l
4>t + 'Pn + linvHHn,t + e„,t _ , (1)
The Xi are a set of household control variables including number of adult males, number of
adult females, number of children, a dummy for male head of household, age of household head,
age of head squared, years of schooling of head. In addition, we allow for a time-specific fixed-effect
0j, a household-specific fixed-effect 4>^, and an effect that potentially varies by the inverse number
of households in the village {invHHt,n)- •_
Equation (1) has strengths and disadvantages. On the one hand, by not adhering to one
particular theoretical model, it allows us to look at a wide range of outcomes that go beyond
the predictions of an explicit theory. On the other hand, equation (1) is at best a reduced form
attempt to approximate a more explicit behavioral model. ^^ In Kaboski and Townsend (2008), our
structural model implies that credit interventions ought to affect the growth rate of income and
'We also used the differenced version of equation (1). This specification had advantage of allowing for fixed effects
on not only levels, but also changes. The specification produced broadly consistent results, but for the components
of consumption and income where measurement error is greater, results were often no longer significant,
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asset accumulation, while affecting the level of choice variables such as consumption and investm.ent.
(When we focus on specific components of income, we look only at levels, since these measures are
noisy, and differencing appears to eliminate most of the signal in the data.) Similarly, for the three
outcome variables that may proxy borrower's ex post ability to repay loans, default, interest rates
and borrowing from informal sources, we ran alternative regressions using either current village
fund credit VFCRn,t or- the lagged value of village fund credit, VFCRn^t--i-
3.1 Heterogeneity of Impacts
In the theories that motivate our study, unobserved heterogeneity (i.e., ability, project size, perma-
nent income) is important and leads to heterogeneous impacts of exogenous shifts in intermediation
(see Kaboski and Townsend, 2008, and Gine and Townsend, 2003, for example). Also, impacts can
be non-linear and time-varying. Moreover, general equilibrium impacts may play a role, and so a
precise policy-relevant interpretation of p is limited, and we will not assign one. We view estimates
of P as rough but nonetheless informative measures of an average linearized impact of the program
on village households, scaled into per baht of credit injected terms.
Still, we are interested in potentially observable heterogeneity in impacts. If women are indeed
more constrained, female headed households may be differentially impacted by the program. When
estimating the differential impacts of female-headed households, we use an additional interaction
term of village fund credit with a dummy variable for female headed households:
I -
1= 1
fPt + 4>n + linvHHn^t + Un,t
where ^2 's the differential impact of credit on female-headed households.
We also looked at impacts based on two other potential proxies for the degree a household is
constrained: tercile of time-averaged income and land-ownership. Households with higher income
tend to borrow more (see Kaboski and Townsend, 2008), so we conjectured that they may be less
constrained by the availability of credit. Similarly, land is necessary to collateralize loans (from the
BAAC, in particular), and so landowners may have been less constrained. We found no evidence of
differential impacts along either of these dimensions, however, and so we do not report the results.
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3.2 Estimation
For the actual estimation of the equations above, we use a two-stage instrumental variables ap-
proach for village fund credit. The instrument used is the interaction between the inverse number
of households in the village and the post-program year dummies. That is, we control for varia-
tion across households correlated with the inverse of village size, but use the additional effect of
village size in post-program years [invHHt^n * Xt=f > where t* is the relevant program year) as our
instrument. This first-stage regression is therefore'^-:
i=l
X2invHHt,nXt=2002 + >'3invHHt,nXt=2003 + (^n,t (3)
The sufficient assumptions for ensuring consistency refer to the error terms in the second-stage
(outcome y„_t) equations, and are given below:
Orthogonality Assumption:
£„,(, Un,t -L invHHt^n * Xt=2002 (4)
£„,t, Un,t J- invHHt,n * Xt=2003
In the discussion of impacts, we will primarily focus on significance of estimates /? and $2 i^i
equations (1) and (2), respectively, at the five-percent level, but also point out significance at the
ten-percent level, when those results are supported by multiple regressions.
Table 2 gives a sample of the first- and second-stage estimation results from the 2SLS procedure
on equations (3) and (1), respectively. The variables of greatest interest are italicized.
In the first stage estimates on the top of the table one can see that the instrument, inverse
village size, is strongly predictive of village fund credit in the years of the Million Baht Program,
but not otherwise. The t-statistics are 17.2 and 19.1 in 2002 and 2003, respectively. The magnitude
"The corresponding equation for default and borrowing from informal sources, where lagged credit is important
is:
' I •' '
VFCIln,t-i = X^ (5..Y.,„,, -H 6>, + 9„
+
XiinvH Ht,n + ^2invH Ht.nXt=2oo2 + ^n,t
Un,t = 'i>t-^'t>n+'yi''^'vHHt-i^n+^n.t and we make the the orthogonality assumption that £„,( -L invHHt-i,n*Xi-i=ioo2-
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of the interacted instrument in 2002 of 575,000 is over 60 percent of the 950,000 (an accumulated
flow) that village funds claimed to have lent out on average. The higher coefficient of 645,000 in
2003 is in line with the higher total household borrowing from village funds in 2003. (Both are
about ten percent higher.) So the coefficients are both statistically significant and economically
meaningful.
The second stage shows that total (i.e., from all sources) village fund credit increased in response
to village fund credit, since the /3 estimate is 1.36. Notice also that 7 in equation (1) is not a
significant predictor in this regression. We return to this in Section 3.4
3.3 Outlier Robustness
The data sliow a great deal of variability, and so the results can be very sensitive to a single or
handful of observations. For example, the vast majority of investments and loans are small, so that
one major investment or loan in the regressions can swamp all the activity happening at a smaller
scale.
We run seven different regressions in order to deal with this problem:
• The first regression is a standard two-stage fixed-effect least squares regression omitting house-
holds in villages with greater than 250 households and fewer than 50 households. This excludes
nine of 64 villages. In 2002, the two very small villages had 30 and 34 households, while the
large villages had 268, 297, 305, 314, 400, 900, and 3194 households. We refer to this as the
baseline regression.
• The second regression is identical to the first regression except that it uses all 64 villages.
• The third regression drops the top and bottom one percent of non-zero values of the dependent
variable. If there is a mass point greater than one percent at (at least) one of the endpoints
of the distribution, we do not drop any observations from that end.
• The fourth regression deals with outliers by modifying the dependent variable into a dummy
variable. Thus, the dependent variable used in this regression are indicator variable
,\
^
^.q,
which is one if the dependent variable is positive, and zero otherwise. For example, the agri-
cultural investment variable would be one if the household made an agricultural investment
(regardless of the size of the investment) and zero if it did not. The village fund credit in
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this regression is similarly an indicator variable, XvFCRn t>o- Except for the problems in in-
terpreting coefficients in a linear probability model, the estimated coefficients can be viewed
as the increase in the probability that the dependent variable is positive given a household
received a loan from the village fund.
• The fifth regression is similar to the fourth regression, except the indicator variable used is
whether the dependent variable is above the panel average for the household, Xy„ ^>y in levels
and \'^ ^^ in differences. That is, the indicator is one if the dependent variable is higher
than average for the household, and zero otherwise. The indicator variable for village fund
credit is analogous, XvFCR^,t>VFCRn °^ ^AVFC/?n,,>AVFC7!n- Again, the loose interpretation
of the coefficient on village fund credit would be the increase in the probability that the
dependent variable is above average given a household had above average credit from village
funds.
3.4 Exogeneity of Village Size
_
The results section will focus on our /3 estimates, but here we will first focus on the estimates
of 7, the coefficient on inverse village size that is not specific to program years. That is, we ask
the question whether inverse village size is a significant explanatory variable even in non-program
years.
On the one hand, the analysis of 7 estimates is somewhat limited in how relevant and informative
it can be to our exogeneity assumption. Regarding its relevance, our exogeneity assumption requires
that after controlling for inverse village size, the differential impact of inverse village size in the
years of the program be the result of the program. That is, it is effectively a difference-in-differences
approach, so 7 = is neither necessary nor sufficient for our exogeneity assumption (4) to hold.
Regarding its informativeness, since we include household-specific fixed effects, 7 is effectively
identified using the relatively small within-village variation in inverse village size over time.
On the other hand, if we had observed that village size were significantly explaining variation
in our outcome variables even before the program, then we might have questioned our exogeneity
assumption. It is therefore comforting to report that inverse village size generally plays an important
role only in program years. In regressions using the 37 variables (i.e., 11 credit market variables,
including new short-term credit and short-term village fund credit itself; 14 consumption variables,
including total consumption; and 12 income, investment, and input use variables including income
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and asset growth), only three are significant even using a more conservative ten percent level of
significance. 3 out of 37 is 8 percent, and so even these may simply be Type I errors. Small villages
tended to have higher levels of short-term credit in fertilizer (7=1.14e6 with a standard error of
5.02e5) and higher shares of total income from rice (8.23, std. error 2.94) and other crops (4.13,
std. error 2.20). Thus, they appear more agrarian. Oddly, when we focus on all villages, not just
those with between 50 and 250 households, the fertilizer result completely disappears, though the
results for rice and other crop income remain. '
The possibility of differential trends is perhaps more relevant to our difference-in-difference
approach. Since the program occurs during the latter years of the panel, if village size were
associated with differential changes over time, this would bring the validity of our instrument into
doubt. To analyze this, we modified the previous regressions of the form (1) to:
-
"
r
yn,t = J2 '^'^^'^".t + PVFCRn,t +
i=l
4>i+(pn + 'JiinvHHt,ri+')'2^nvHHt^n*t + en,t (5)
where 72 now measures time trends that vary with the number of households in a village. Here
again we found little evidence of differences across villages. The estimates of 72 was only significant
at the ten percent level in one of the 37 regressions, well within the rate of Type I errors. Smaller
villages showed higher growth in the fraction of total income coming from wages (72=-!. 29, std.
error 0.75), but inclusion of the control only reinforced the estimated positive $ impact of village
fund credit on the fraction of income that coming from wages.
3.5 GIS Robustness
Another question of interest is to what extent the impacts of credit spillover to non-borrower
households. One interpretation of the above specifications assumes that the effects are only on
the borrowing household. Of course, viewing each village as a small (open) economy, we might
presume that credit injections could affect even non-borrowing villagers, through internal general
equilibrium effects, in particular. In this case, a second interpretation of the /3 estimates in (1)
would be the impact of an additional dollar of credit in the village on the outcome, rather than the
impact of directly borrowing an additional dollar on the household's outcome. What is important
for this interpretation is that households only benefit from credit injection into its own village.
That is, any impacts of credit on non-borrowers must be local to the village.
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We test whether it is the local injection of credit into the village that drives our results, or
whether neighboring village also has important effects. That is, we construct a GIS control variable
for the size of neighboring villages. The control variable is a spatial kernel estimate of the inverse
village size (number of households) of neighboring villages (e.g., all villages in a 5 kilometer radius).
The second-stage regressions are therefore of the form:
/
yn,t = 2^ OiiXi^n,t + PVFCRn,t + l^invHHn,t,neighborhood * X'/:>=2002 +
i=\
<t>t + 4>n + -yinvHHt^n + £n,t (6)
The results we present are overwhelmingly robust to the inclusion of such a neighborhood control
variable. The signs of ^ estimates from regressions of equation (6) agree with those of equation (1)
in eighty-eight percent of the regressions, and the magnitudes are generally quite similar. Of course,
the reduced independent variation in VFCRn,t often increases the standard errors of estimates, but
nevertheless seventy percent of the $ that were significant in equation (1) were also significant in
equation (6). Finally, the jl estimate was not a strong predictor of outcomes and was significant in
only twenty percent of the regressions. In the Results section that follows, we note any important
exceptions.
Together, the robustness of our results to the GIS variable support the claim that in the two
years after the program's founding, which we study, impacts remained local to the village, and our
view of the experiment on separate village economies appears justified. .
,; ,
•,.. ;,
4 Results
Table 3 presents estimates of the program's short-term impacts on four key summary variables:
credit, consumption, asset growth and income growth. The table reports estimates of /? along with
standard errors, and significance at the five and ten percent levels is noted. Each of the columns
corresponds to a different outcome variable, while the rows correspond to the baseline regression
(at the top) and the four alternatives that address the influence of outliers (below).
The first column of estimates indicates that the flow of total new short-term credit increased.
That is, the program was successful in increasing overall credit and did not simply crowd out
other sources of credit. There actually is some evidence from the levels regression that the credit
injection may have had a multiplier effect (i.e., a baht of credit injected by the village fund led to
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more than one baht of additional total credit), though none are significantly greater than one at
the five percent level.
Similarly, the second column shows substantial and significant increase in consumption levels.
Indeed, the estimates suggest that the increased value of consumption is of the same order of
magnitude as the credit injection, or even larger with the baseline estimate of an additional 2.03
baht of consumption for every baht of village fund credit injected. The estimate that drop outhers
also indicate a large number (1.24). ,. , :.. .,
The third column indicates some evidence that credit lowered the log growth of assets. Recall
assets includes the value of physical assets and financial assets (net of loans). The estimates from
the dummy variable regressions in the bottom two rows show that credit significantly lowered the
probability of households with positive (-0.50) and above average (-0.38) asset growth of households.
Although, interpretation of linear probability models is necessarily problematic, the coefficients
would indicate that households with loans were 50 percentage points less likely to have positive
asset growth (row 4), and 38 percentage points less likely to have asset growth above the household's
average asset growth (row 5). Of course, such "households-with-loans" interpretations implicitly
assume that the impacts flow only to borrowers.
Using similar interpretations, the fourth column indicates that households were (38 percentage
points) more likely to have rising income, and (51 percentage points) more hkely to have an increase
in income that exceeded the household's average increase.
To summarize, we see a substantial increase in credit on the order of the size of the injection,
a comparable, perhaps larger, increase in consumption, and a higher preponderance of low asset
growth, and high income growth. ,
,
.
The large increase in credit may be evidence of credit constraints. The large increase in con-
sumption - of similar magnitude, if not larger, than the increase in credit - is a striking finding.
A major argument in favor of credit interventions like the Million Baht Program is that the poor
in non-intermediated sectors actually have returns to investment that exceed market interest rates
and the returns to investment in the financially-intermediated sector.
The observed large increase in consumption might indicate that the returns are actually high-
est in consumption. Such behavior is quantitatively consistent with Kaboski and Townsend (2008) 's
structural buffer stock savings model. In this model, two groups increase consumption: consumption-
constrained households with short-term liquidity needs, and households with buffer stocks that are
larger than necessary after the credit constraint has been relaxed. The second group can make
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consumption growth exceed credit growth, since they increase consumption without actually bor-
rowing. '^'^ The intermediation and growth explanation is that constraints are binding on investment
and input use and the observed income growth may reflect this. The asset growth might then
be a result of households with higher future income intertemporally substituting toward present
consumption (as in the intermediation and growth models). Finally, even though we focus on
non-durable consumption, the increase in consumption may have an investment aspect to it.
To gain more insight into these issues, we analyze each of the impacts (credit, consumption,
and income/assets) more closely below.
4.1 Impact on the Credit Market
In Table 4, we delve more deeply into the impacts of the program on the credit market. For the
purpose of comparison, the first column reproduces the results for the impact on total new short-
term credit of Table 3. The next two columns show the impacts of village fund credit on credit
from other formal sources, namely, the BAAC/agricultural cooperatives and commercial banks. In
the baseline sample, the first column value of 1.11 indicates that the program has a larger impact
on BAAC credit than village fund credit itself. This large number for the BAAC drives the high
value (2.13) for total new short-term credit in the baseline sample. The very large numbers for total
new short-term credit and credit from the BAAC are particular to the baseline sample, however,
since using the full sample of villages or dropping outliers lowers both point estimates and standard
errors substantially. Indeed, neither of the regressions using dummy variables even find an impact
on BAAC credit. Instead, they find that the frequency of short-term loans from commercial banks
actually falls mildly. ' ' ^ ' ' •
The fact that the estimates for the BAAC and commercial banks are highly dependent on
the treatment of outliers is consistent with the fact that formal lenders make large but infrequent
loans (see Kaboski and Townsend, 1998). Indeed, it emphasizes the advantages of looking at these
different cuts of the data.
The middle columns of the table show the impacts on short-term credit categorized by the
households' own stated reasons for borrowing. That is the right hand-side variables are the sum of
all short-term credit borrowed for a given stated purpose. Common stated reasons for borrowing
Another potential way that the program could impact non-borrowers consumption is through relending to non-
borrowers as in Angelucci and De Georgi, 2006. We do not view such indirect borrowing as an important channel in
the Thai context, since we found no substantial or significant increase in household lending to others, whether inside
or outside of the village.
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include the reasons we report (consumption, fertilizer use, business investment, and agricultural
investment), but these are not the only stated reasons. We estimate no significant impact on
borrowing for business investment or agricultural investments, but salient efi'ects on the amount
of borrowing for which either fertilizer or consumption were the stated reasons for borrowing.
Depending on the regression, the top three rows indicate that the increase in fertilizer borrowing
is 0.41 to 0.76 baht for every baht of village fund credit borrowed, while the increase in borrowing
for consumption is 0.63 to 0.72 baht for every baht borrowed from the village fund. Households are
31 percentage points more likely to borrow for consumption, and 39 percent more likely to borrow
more than they borrow on average for consumption.
Clearly, the reason for borrowing should be ambiguous, since money is fungible across uses. We
will see, however, that the investment and consumption borrowing patterns are reflected by actual
levels of investment and consumption, while fertilizer usage is not. Fertihzer and pesticide usage
may simply be a fallback reason that households give for borrowing; in the past, a large share of
loans from the BAAC in the past were given for such use, for example.
The final six columns of Table 4 show the effect of the program on other aspects of the credit
market: interest rates, default, and informal borrowing. We distinguish between the impact on the
credit market in the year the loans were taken, and the impact on the credit market in the year
the loans were due. The results indicate that the injection of did not appear to have large effects
on the overall credit market. First, the fact that short-term interest rates did not fall (and perhaps
even rose slightly) is supporting evidence that households were credit constrained."''' The taking
of loans seems to have httle effect on default and the use of informal credit. The results for the
impact on credit market in the year of repayment provide some evidence of tighter credit markets,
however. There is some evidence that more households are in default, and face higher interests
rates after borrowing, but they do not appear to be resorting more to informal lenders in the year
of repayment.''^
"''When outliers are excluded from the sample there is an increase in the interest rate. This may be driven somewhat
by loans from commercial banks or from informal sources such as money lenders, stores, or neighbors, all of whom
charge higher interest rates than relatives and the BAAC. Using the average credit per household of 9600 baht, the
row 3 estimates of 1.75e-6 (current year) and 3.49e-6 (subsequent year) would imply 1.7 and 3.3 percentage point
(170 and 330 basis point, respectively) higher interest rates. Over the full period, the average nominal interest rate
on short-term credit is 9.2 percent (recall Table 1), so quantitatively the effect is not negligible.
''''Kaboski and Townsend (2008) allow impacts to vary over the first and second years and find that indeed default
rates are significantly lower in the first year but higher in the second year of the program, which would also be
consistent with such an interpretation.
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4.2 Impact on Consumption
Table 3 showed a substantial impact on consumption, and Table 4 showed that stated borrowing for
consumption increased in a similar fashion. We analyze here the impacts on different components
of nondurable consumption in Table 5. Durable consumption showed no significant impacts and
are therefore not presented. A first observation from Table 5 is that the consumption of several
components of nondurables are unaffected by the credit program. The fact that "necessities" like
grain, meat and tobacco do not increase is perhaps not surprising, but other components such as
ceremonies, eating out, and educational expenditures are also not significantly affected. Our result
of no measured impact on educational expenditures should not be construed as evidence against
credit constraints in educational investment, since an increase in the opportunity cost of going to
school may have offset the reduced cost from credit constraints.
The components with the largest responses to the credit programs are housing repair and vehicle
repair, which are investment-like in the sense that they have a durable aspect to them. Housing
repair expenditures are sizable but infrequent, and so do not show up in the regression using
dummy variables. The estimate indicates that a baht of village fund credit led to 0.26-1.52 baht of
expenditures on household repair and 0.15-0.20 baht on vehicle repair.
Vehicle repair expenditures also increased significantly in frequency with households 25 percent-
age points more likely to have spent money on vehicle repair, and 21 percentage points more likely
to spend more than the average for the household. In addition, the frequency of households with
positive expenditures (0.17) and above average expenditures (0.33) on fuel increased. Perhaps this
is related to vehicle repairs. To the extent that vehicles are necessary inputs into production or
transportation to jobs, such repairs may be investments with high returns rather than consumption.
Karlan and Zinman (2008) make a similar argument.
The other components with statistically significant increases are spending on dairy (0.05 to 0.06
baht per baht of credit), alcohol consumed both at home (0.06 to 0.09) and outside of the home
(about 0.03), and clothing (0.01).
An earlier version of this paper produced mixed reactions toward the measured increase in
consumption among policy makers in Thailand. One intention of the program was to use the funds
for productive purposes, so some viewed the increase in consumption (together with the increased
default) as evidence that villagers had "wasted" the funds. The breakout of consumption shows
however that the components that policy makers might particularly associate with waste (e.g.
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alcohol or clothing) show relatively small increases or even declines (e.g., tobacco), while again the
repair services, which have an aspect of investment to them, show the largest response.
We turn to now to impacts on traditional productive activities.
,
<
,,
4.3 Impact on Productive Activities
Recall that in Table 3, we saw that income growth increased as a result of the village fund credit.
Table 6 examines this in more detail by showing impact estimates for income, investment and input
use. In the first three columns, we examine the effect of credit on the fraction of income generated
from the most important sources of earned income: business profits, wage/salary labor income, and
agricultural income from rice, other crops and livestock. '.
The relative importance of business and wage income increased in response to the program.
Given the average credit per household in the data of 9600 baht, the significant coefhcient on
business income in the second row of 3.00e-6 about a three percentage point increase in the fraction
of income from business profits. Since business income is less common and is also quite skewed,
the treatment of outliers greatly affects the significance of results. The effect on wage and salary
income is more robust to the cut of data. The second row coefficient of 5.93e-6 indicates that a
household with the average credit per household experienced on average roughly a six percentage
point increase in its fraction of income from labor income. Similarly, we see declines in the fraction
of income from rice and other crops, and an increase in the importance of livestock. Only the
decline in the fraction of income from "other crops" is significant, however. It is roughly the order
of magnitude of the increase in business income. These results are broadly consistent with the
models of intermediation, entrepreneurship, and growth, and the stated aims of the program.
On the other hand, the results in the middle columns on measures of investment and input use
do not support a story in which credit is needed for either start-up costs or business investment.
Specifically, the last five columns focus on this investment behavior and the use of inputs. We
see no significant impact on business starts, and the coefficient on business investment is actually
negative. We do however see some evidence of increased payment of wages. This may indicate that
set up costs or the fixed cost of investment are less important barriers to business expansion than
some models assume (e.g., Banerjee and Newman, 1993, Lloyd-Elhs and Bernhardt, 2000). Indeed,
over half of the new businesses started in the seven year panel reported no start-up costs, and 75
percent of new businesses required less than the 9600 baht/household of average credit injected
by the program. It may also be that many business options require set-up costs of indivisible
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investments that are too large to be reasonably impacted by microfinance interventions (Ahlin and
Jiang, 2008, Buera, Kaboski, and Shin, 2008).
Related, the lack of an impact on business investment may also reflect the fact that business
investments are infrequent, large and skewed. Only 8 percent of observations show positive business
investment, and one percent of observations constitute three-quarters of all business investment.
These large investments that drive overall investment levels (e.g., a warehouse or ten-wheel truck)
are not only rare, they may be less likely to be affected by the presence of microloans than more
common small investments. Indeed, we do discern impacts on agricultural investment, but only a
significantly higher probabihty of investing (22 percent more Ukely) and of investing more than
the household's average (17 percent more likely) when village fund loans are taken. Kaboski and
Townsend (2008) develop this argument quantitatively, showing that the infrequency and lumpiness
of investments may make it difficult to discern impacts on investment levels given our sample size.
It is also possible that credit plays a more important role as working capital for input use rather
than for investment. We see an actual reduction in the use of fertihzer, despite the increase in the
amount of borrowing for which fertilizer was a stated reason. The decline in fertilizer usage may
be consistent with the observed decline in the fraction of income from crops. "^^ In contrast, we find
some evidence of an increase in payments to workers (0.17 in the third row), which corroborates
the increased importance of wage income. It is also interesting that credit did not significantly
increase the fraction of households businesses (as can be seen by row 4), or hiring outside workers
(not shown). This again may imply that the impact is not running through the extensive margin,
but instead the intensive margin. Payments to labor may also be running through the wage (or
hours), since the fraction of workers with labor market earnings does not significantly increase. '^^
An increase in the actual wage rate is a strong prediction of models of intermediation, entre-
preneurship and growth, and we therefore examine the evidence for wage rate increases a little
more directly. Although the annual data does not have separate data on wages, the monthly panel
provides direct evidence of a general equilibrium effect on prices (i.e., wages) from the program.
The monthly data breaks out days of labor supply and daily wages by activity, but is a smaller
•^^ Analysis of our soil samples indicates that fertilizer usage maj' have already been excessive. (Wivutvongvana
and Jiraporncharoen, 2002). Village fund credit is more fungible than fertilizer loans from the BAAC, which are
denominated in currency, but sometimes distributed in kind. Substitution toward village fund credit could therefore
drive down the total amount of fertilizer in the village, even if fertilizer were the stated reason for borrowing for both
sources.
^'^In the annual data, we have indirect measures of wage earnings in villages, namely the responses of maximum
wage paid and minimum wage paid for the small sample of households who hired labor. These variables did not pick
up significant effects on the wage, but are also very imperfect measures.
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sample of (16) villages, and the very high frequency of the data creates timing issues (e.g., should
credit affect outcomes in the month it is disbursed, some period after disbursement, or for the
loan period, or after it is repaid?) Given the smaller sample of households in the monthly data,
we emphasize results with a ten percent level of significance. We do not present the results, but,
using regressions that best replicate the annual data, the monthly data corroborates the significant
positive impact we found on labor income."''^ Thus, we view this data as informative.
; , ,
Regressions using the monthly data also yield significant wage effects for several occupation
categories consistent with the findings on income as shown in Table 7. Results for the dummy
variable regressions are not available, so we instead include results for a regression that drops
the 5 percent of outliers in the tails. '^^ There are three interesting findings to note. First, in
the first column, the regressions that control for outliers show a significant negative impact on
agricultural wage rates, which would be consistent with the lower fraction of agricultural income
described above. Second, there are no significant impacts on factory workers, merchants, and
government/professional wages, which would often be performed outside of the village. Third,
there are significant positive impacts on wages in general-non agricultural work, construction, and
"other", which together constitute a third of all observations. The coefficients are sizable. For
example, given the average credit per household in the data of 9600 baht, the coefficient of 0.0005
would constitute about 15 percent of the average wage. The positive effect on construction wages
in the villages, which is even more evident and striking when the contemporaneous flow of credit
is used instead of the lagged stock, is particularly interesting because it is only evident for local
wages. Wages for construction work in other counties (including Bangkok) do not increase. This
is consistent with the idea of village economies, with (partially) segmented labor markets, and also
with the increases in the consumption of household repairs found above.
4.4 Differential Impact on Women
We examined whether the impacts of credit were significantly different for female-headed households
using all of the outcome measures. Overall, perhaps the most surprising result that female-headed
households behave similarly to households headed by males. We found no significant differential
The credit variable is a point in time stock of outstanding short-term credit, while the outcome variables are the
twelve month growth in total income and income by source twelve months later.
' The regression using a dummy variable for positive outcome is not possible, since wages are all positive. The
regression using a dummy variable for above average outcome is possible, but it is not straightforward whether the
household's average wage for a certain occupation or average overall should be used. Neither of these produced strong
results.
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impacts of the village fund on female headed household with respect to credit or agricultural income.
The only significant differential impacts were on the sources of income, and the distribution of
consumption. Table 8 summarizes these impact results, i.e., estimates of ,02 i'^ equation (2).
Looking at the sources of income, the significant difference between male- and female-headed
households is that credit causes a relatively larger positive impact on the fraction of female-headed
households reporting positive and above average business income than on the fraction of male-
headed households. Female-headed households are about ten percentage points more likely to have
positive and above average business income (see the fourth and fifth row).
Their are also significant responses of female-headed households is in their consumption patterns,
but not in the ways typically argued in the literature. In other countries, the literature (e.g., Pitt
and Khandker, 1998) has found that men tend to spend money on things such as alcohol, while
women's spending patterns are directed toward children. Our results in Thailand differ. For
example, women do not spend more on children's education in response to credit. Indeed, the
credit program significantly lowered the probability that a female-headed household would have
educational expenditures above average for the household (see the bottom row). There is also some
evidence that female-headed households shift consumption more toward auto repair and clothing,
and especially toward meat consumption. Finally, we do find that female-headed households shift
consumption less toward alcohol consumed outside of the home, but surprisingly there is some
evidence (the last row) that they instead increase their consumption of alcohol in the home. From
informal discussions, we have learned that drinking outside of the home is less culturally acceptable
for women in Thailand than for men.
5 Conclusions
The Milhon Baht Village Fund injection of microcredit in villages has had the desired effect of
increasing overall credit in the economy. Households have responded by borrowing more, consuming
more, and investing in agriculture more often than before. The village fund credit has had the effect
of decreasing future assets, increasing future incomes, and making business and market labor more
important sources of income. The fact that households increased borrowing despite higher interest
rates, together with the consumption, investment, and asset responses point to a relaxation of
credit constraints. The increased interest rates, increased credit from non-village fund sources, and
increased labor income and especially wage rates indicate important general equilibrium effects that
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may have also affected non-borrowers. Such general equilibrium effects from expanded financial
intermediation are important channels of development in models of finance and growth.
The large increase in borrowing and consumption and the decline in assets are broadly consistent
with buffer stock models of credit constrained households. Our companion paper develops this fink
more explicitly and in a quantitative fashion, but the reduced form analysis of this paper shows
that the composition of consumption increases is not only toward luxury goods but also repairs.
Similarly, the increase in income, and the increasing importance of business and labor income are
consistent with models of intermediation and growth. The general equilibrium impact on wages
that we discover offers more credence to these models, where rising wages play an important role.
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Table 1. Summan' Statistics of Relevant Townsend Thai Household-Level Data
No of Obs. Mean Std Dev
Short-Term Credit Variables
New Short-Term Credit (Total)
Village Fund Credii
BAAC/Ag Coop Credit
Commercial Bank Credit
Informal Credit
Credit for Agricultural Investment
Credit for Business Investment
Credit for Fertilizer, Pesticides, etc.
Credit for Consumption
Consumption Variables
Total Consumption
Education
Grain
Dairy
Meat
Alcohol at Home
Alcohol Out of home
Fuel
Tobacco
Ceremony
House Repair
Vehicle Repair
Clothes
Eatins Out
5,831
5,831
5,831
5,831
5,831
5,831
5,831
5,831
5,831
5,767
5,784
5,767
5,767
5,767
5,767
5,767
5,767
5,767
5,767
5,784
5,784
5,784
5,784
20,900
2,600
11,000
300
5,600
1.400
3,600
10,100
8,300
75,300
5,200
8,900
2,100
4,100
1,900
900
5,000
1,100
5,200
6,300
2,100
1.500
1.900
50,600
6,900
30,900
7,000
31,800
10,000
31,900
33,200
24,600
Credit Market Indicators
Average Short-Term Credit Interest Rate 2,982 0,095 0.139
Flow of Credit into Default 5,831 12,300 75,100
101,500
11,000
11,300
4,400
4,700
4,800
3,600
11,400
3,000
13,000
37.000
8,100
2,500
5,400
Income and Asset Variables
(Total) Net Income
Business Income
Wage and Salary Income
Gross Income from Rice Farming
Gross Income from Other Crops
Gross Income from Livestock
Gross Assets (incl. savings)
5,825
5,825
5,808
5,808
5,808
5,808
5,614
96,900
16,500
31,500
20,800
21.200
6,956
,577.000 4,
193,500
148,600
65,000
37,000
95,100
50,600
108,000
Investment and Input Uses Variables
Number ofNew Businesses
Business Investment
Agricultural Investment
Expenditure on Fertilizer, Pesticides, etc.
5.823
5,831
5,824
5,825
0.05
3,400
3,300
9,100
0.24
48,400
28,600
20,700
Other Control Variables
Male Head of Household Dummy
Age of Head
Years of Education of Head
Number of Male Adults in Household
Number of Female Adults in Household
Number of Kids in Household
Farming Dummy for Household Head's Primary Occupation
5,790
5,790
5,679
5,790
5,790
5,790
5.831
0.73
53.7
6.15
1.45
1.56
1.54
0.61
0.44
13.4
3.17
0.90
0.76
1.20
0.49
Instrument
Inverse Milage Size 5,831 0.0 II 0.007
Table 2. Sample Regression - Two-Stage Household Fixed-Effect Estimate of the Impact of
Current Level of Village Fund Credit on New Short-Term Credit Level
First Stage: Village Fund Credit on Instruments Coeff. Std. Err. t-vaiue
Constant (1997 Dummy Excluded) -6,400** 2,800 -2.61
Year= 1998 Dummy 40 310 0.11
Year= 1999 Dummy 90 320 0.27
Year=2000 Dummy 40 330 0.12
Year=2001 Dummy 140 340 0.40
Year=2002 Dummy 2,670** 490 5.48
Year=2003 Dummy 3,090** 500 6.24
Numberof Adult Males in Household -80 150 -0.57
Number of Adult Females in Household 520** 160 3.11
NumberofChildren(< 18 years) in Household 220** 110 2.00
Male Head of Household 960** 480 2.01
Head of Household's Primary Occupation is Farming -17 230 -0.08
Age of Head 250** 100 2.50
Age of Head Squared -2.39** 0.88 -2.73
Years ofEducation- Head of Household • -1.64 70 -0.02
Inverse Village Size (invHH) -30,300 48,900 -0.62
Interaction ofInverse Village Size and Year=2002 Dummy 575,300** 33,400 1 7.2
Interaction ofInverse Village Size and Year=2003 Dummy 645,600** 33,800 19.1
Number of Observations/Groups 5.679 / 828
Second Stage: New Short-Term Credit on Predicted Village Fund Credit
Constant (1997 Dummy Excluded) 20,500 22,170 0.18
Year= 1998 Dummy 7,230** 2,520 2.86
Year= 1999 Dummy 8,420** 2,590 3.25
Year=2000 Dummy 5,220** 2,650 1.97
Year=2001 Dummy 7,160** 2,730 2.62
Year=2002 Dummy 1,260 3,870 0.32
Year=2003 Dummy 810 4,190 0.10
Number ofAdult Males in Household 2,240** 1,130 1.99
Number ofAdult Females in Household 1380 1,280 1.07
Number of Children (< 18 years) in Household • 830 880 0.95
Male Head of Household 11,480** 3,730 3.08
Head of Household's Primary Occupation is Farming -2980 1,780 -1.68
Age of Head ' 20 780 0.02
Age of Head Squared 0.08 6.91 -0.01
Years ofEducation -Head of Household -470 570 -0.82
Inverse Village Size (invHH) -153,700 382.500 -0.40
Village Fund Credit (predicted) }.-W* Q.33 4.12
Number of Observations/Groups 5.472 / 800
Note: ** indicates significance at 5%
s
u
U
S
S
u
cs
c
c
3
z
55
H
M Zl
in lO
(L> OJ
-a- -*
MS O 0.38** (0.19) 0.51** (0.20)
1 :
\o —
.
(N O
* .—
^
1 ^U 1
— On
od f^
1
i=2
2°
c
a
o
U
r^ oo
« ON
2s.
-i-f.
* •*
"^ 2o —
New
Short-Term
Credit
Level
* . V
* oo
~ O
* .—
.
* rn
# .^—
.
* MO (N
* ,—
-
o ~
* CA
(N —
t^ do —
ss /
a: > /
/ o/ 3/ -S"
/ ^
Baseline
Regression:
Only
Villages
With
50-200
Households
>
OX)
a
3
S
OJU
3
OS v:
ll
CI 5?
Regression
with
DVs
for
Positive
Response
Value
and
Village
Fund
Credit
Regression
with
DVs
for
Above
Average
Response
Value
and
VF
Credit
j3 n -°
P .3
C W)
(U
« > 5
E .= i
*- ^ ra2
o
3 -^
o -a
'r- rn a>
^^ OJ TO
D
ffl
•~"
->
-a
O tnUm
O >
C
O (L>
>N r, ?^u r:!
c: 033
O
c/5
on
03
to
IS
n lyi -^
n
O oij (/I
•n -a c
C3 «j
u cd
c/l —
1)
OJ
b>
PI VI
CO
P3
c
wi"
en 13
OJ n c
^ n
c: oij
^
•n •a
n n
13 o> cs
.w
cH
u-i j=
o H
u 00
T^ .~ .^ aj
n> o
o
-a >
'S
1) u V5
> a oto •a oa.
^
o
o a «
o U1 !" aj3 r1 OJl
^ O t:> rt VI
ra __;
;rt n > rt
o
a> f= >
!^ P 3 aj "n
'c75
3 [/I
-n o
v:
m cd
* a VI
v-. a>
u- O JD
OJ o
>
n c
en (U o
t/i
ail o ^-
>
ra (N <u
-a
5
-n
VI
1^ o
c
-o
u-> > rt -o
m c x>
n
a
3
n
rt
o
<L>
C
o
u >
O
o
11
o
c
o
'vi
VI
Si
-u
T3 oh
C/5 i> V rrt ,>, 1)
H O +3 ^4-1
Informal 3 "^
'T CO
" O O f^ 'a- rj
6X)
o
Creditt ° £- ?£ 2 2. ° 2- ^ s
Amount of Short-
o >o »o VO (N OO O O lO
CO Term Credit in r~; oo t^ O M 'S; <N —
L.
<
—
^ rs ° C- ° 2 d S "^ 2-
c«
Defaultt
im
o
o
Avg. Short-Term vp NO * ^ o S- (N P
>• Credit Interest
<^ 00 (N —
;
?;^ 2 o d d
Ratet T :£, rri ri rn ~
Informal o ^
NO dro _ -a- tN~
^ Credit o d 9 o 2 d 2 o "^ 2-
•-
~
—
'
—
'
5 6X'
Q
Amount of Short-
— \0 O VO ;5 o S ^ fN pU Term Credit in O <N m (^ q ro q _ q _ka
_- r-H ° £, 2 2- 2 2- 2 £o
>
Default ""
^o Co o Co 5= ?
Avg. Short-Term U (V)oo „ i i,CN OO ^^
O o
Credit Interest Rate <N _ I/-; fsl tq 2 2 o 2 o
'T ^
« , )
' ^"^
* ^—
~
* -—
.
* .—
^
* .—
.
* .—
^
Credit for * r^l * OO * r-l * —
'
* —
r^ fn rj — 0\ —
.
Consumption ^ d t^ d >-: d n d n do ^^ o — o •— o ^- o ^
o * y—
-
* .— * ^^ , ^ * .—
.
I- Credit for « ONMS m
* r-1 * >o o o &2
o
CO Fert., Pest., etc.
<-. d ^ d ^ d d d <~i do — O ^ o -^ o —
u
o
a.
Credit for
o oo [^ o o -* NO r^ »0 r^ >n
Business r^ r~t — <N o — O O o o
U ^ 2- ^ S- ^ 2 ^ 2 ° 2
OS Investment
C5
55 Credit for ^_^ ^ , . , ^.^ , ,
— in (Nl OO 't NO OO NO to lO
Agricultural o o o o o o o o
^ 2, ^ 2, d d d d d dInvestment
*
,
* ^
"« Commercial Bank o o o G"o o 3 rn2 o ss |S
M ^^
Credit ^ £- ° 2- ?2 d2 d2
* ,—
.
* /—
o
BAAC/Ag. Coop # ON
d 2
3g -* ON— o
Credit ~ d ^ d 2 2 '^ 2O —
'
* .— * .—
.
* -—
,
* ^— * ,
—
* oo * r^ * (N * —
'
* r^
New Short-Term Credit
~ d 0. 2
o rj
S 2 '^. d ^ d(N ^^ o ~ o —
I. 41 .- U S'
.. o
.2 .= "'
*^
-^i "^
< 3
<2|-g
1« « u ». 2 -a
2 S / bX] O > > u ^2 2:
/
^1 /
a: > /
/ 3
• -2"
,4*
2^1
oj j; "
«5
1 2= on
c n
2 i=
u
6D
1/3 ^
bX)
as
«
•!>
bJJ K -3
« o c
Of C n
5 " =
.2 > «
S O 3
as <
E
C
H
on
ta
'i
>
E
c
CO X)
tn ?^
<u
«
E r: ^
^
n
ct: 1/3
•a
-a i:
o
t/3
-J
3
XI
M
o
? -0
J-1 -a
r,
— D "Lt ta
c -D [/5
"3
n
3
D
S2
x>
ta
*-•
«j m s3 >
m • — b
-o
o
c3
CO 5
X! u
>
ta
P c n
C
o (i> yj= V
E -a' ^
ta
e3o 3
so
ta
-n "S
-n
t/i ta tj
o C/3
-0
la
n ,:> ,>
1+-
o
t/1
o
on
"3
-o
1)
1)
-a
0>
3
ta
t/1
a>
c cd
^ __
»-*
a>
Wl i/> r
n
p i- r-) olOli
H "T-l n OJ3
-n x>
-a <u ta C3
(1)
o
OB
J3
ta
t/j
>
r,
-T-1 .ti n (L)
E
i)
X oo
T3
t/]
I/)
1)
> 2
n
o
C/3
00
u
?S cfi
o
Jd
3
O 4j
00
ca
T3
(Li
'0
c/T
'>
^
?
o 'g a
3
E
"C
-a m
i?5
3
•a
a-
t/i
-n
tii
a;
tu
^ m
t4- H
t£
•rr
a.
M 0> ri rz
>
s?
in
JL)
XI
.2
>
•a
1) ID
I
ta
-o
u
u
-a
S3
rt
'_ XI a
c5
-*-
u
00
ta
>
r4
.2
00
5)
*
T3
c
H 2
Of)
>n iri O rn ]^ <~Nl NO O O r^
Eating Out o o o o P o o —
'^ £ ° £ ? £ ^ £ ^ £
u Ji
X) r-
^ H
* ^^ cO (N (N — * — jn On — m 5 u
Clothes q q q q CNl oP d
P O (N —
en — Po o d d ? £ '^ £" o ^^
1'^ iS .S -a
* ,—
-
* -^—
.
, , * ^^ , (H ^ cso * ^ •rf r*-i * o L <N •^ S -
Vehicle Repair o —
^ d
O O
° £
ir, —
^ d d £ 3 o .t;« <u ?o ^^ o -- o ^-^
'^ 3 "S
t. ^ o
* ^-v * .—
^
<N
d £
,
—
^
^^—
^
i; C^ 2m * o NO — NO O
-g o u
3 U .3House Repair "^ d
o —
^ £ "^ £o ^-^ =
-e <u
^ « C .N
_0 3 w
c rt ^ O
w ^ (N "* ^ S 5^ 2; i^ S ?-? c <u aoC i^ M
— iJ —
3 > >
s
o Ceremony "^ 2.
o _
9 £
^ o
£ d
P o
9 £
O _J
£ £Q.
C
i*.
-a s;
O 3 <Uo c
U c ^^ ,^ , , . * '— —
^
t. n >
'^ <N tN CNl CJ .—4 ^^ ^ ON >R (N "" .,- =
VI c Tobacco q q q o o o 2 o O ^- ^ OJ •—
^ s o o '^ £ "^ £ ^ £ ? £ 3 c ^3 o 3:3 5 = 3
«i
u
«
* ^^ * —
,
£ -O CDS — o NO OO in -^ * t-~ * (N ^ OJ DJD
_o (;_, Fuel o o o o r^ o r^, —c
=? 5 ^ £ ^ £ •~: d n d
^M t/; o ~ o ^
E O 2! C1
3
S
O
U
o _ __^ * —
.
* .—
.
•s " «
r^i f*^ r^ (-N? * CNl » o OnO 3 n =
O 1/1 3j;^ Alcohol Out O O o o ° d ^l dc ^ 2. ° £ d £ •^ S '"c O ^ o — (^ O c«
u ° ^ 1
o ^ -O 3TO ^ C
* .—
.
* .—
.
22
d £
* .—
.
^
rt 3
» -^ ro m * r) * —
*
-c ^ d
Alcohol Home On O
O —
q qd d
NO o
P d
CNl —
-i d
o —
c> ^ -S^
u — P3 eg
•1 i 13 OB ^
3
B
3 * M- r^ ro (N rT — >o ^ ^Meat o o o o o o o o O _-
° £• ° £ ^ £ ^ £ ? £ 3 "S «
« o S U
BJ3 ^ -C —
_2 U '^ ^c: o
* .— ^— *j
>
r'l iTi * r^ t^ <~n1 (N — — (N <u 00 -
Dairy o o
'^ £
NO O
P d o Pd £ ° £ ^ £
.„ 3 ^ <L>
X 2 " .3o ~^
a
>
O 1^ '^^ (UM -- lo m On (N m o zr On r^
^ £3 « S3 Grain q — O O o o £ o O —
^H d d "^ £ ° £ ? £ ^ £ iS ? cd :=©N- 2 "•> S3
u^
o
4_,
"f T-T 3 «
_«
ra
.5i u h >
NO o NO CJ r*-| in ;5 S" S ^ c f— L- ^
Education —, — '^. o q q P O o ^- C3 3 §5 . "^
^ -a "1 o 3
H ^ £ 9 £ d d 9 £ 9 £
'^
3) « S = V 3
* —
-
* — * * —
* —
'
* NO * m * ^ * K O 3 ^ =
« « « jt sTotal
r^ CO
S£ Q
NO
h£ So ON •f-}- ^ do ^^
>
c
c
1 - /
ai > // o/ 3
• .5"
• '3
.. o
= V,
O _ y,
1^ — ^
^^ 1
2 — S
— > 2
<
1 £
.2 S
3
O
i *- •-£ = -or a*
I/l « L.
> > U
^ °l
> - t
•r oi)>
1 " i
55 < 4)
S g = g 2
5 ^ - ° ^
3 -3 ^ S O
o t+^ cd a> cj
T3 O
J-
>, -
1 :- 5 1 §
.£ -a 3
-S 00—
^ ^-t Cu ni
-3 I*. O « OS
y
BXl
Si
£.|>
oj o s
O 0* =
4) ^ ^
* f- O t > ++
/ Ci c n =i<
<_>
3
o
•a
a
k.
U
a
c
3
w
SX)
H
•K- #
Pert., Pest., etc. P o ;^2
On
S°
1
Expenditures ?° 2s 9 2,
*{/5
<U
^"
.—
1
(N ^ 0^ ON »0 fN
Total Wages Paid 9 o 9 o p
— — —
^
3
D.
^
S Agricultural NO in
* .
<n r^?
c
Investment ? s ?° cp "
—
d 9,
u
E
^0)
>•
c
Business ?^s in oi m NO
Investment ?£ ? s ? s ^ £,
^ _ _o G" t-^ (o t^ NO _,__
^
Number of i a> i (u i i •^ ^ r^, NO
lO o iO 00 -*
New Businesses OO »At t--- On r--- ON d d
^ n-i 00 — 00 ^-t '""'
—
'
—
'
'
o Co \o P^ NO G"
_„^
a> a> CJ o (U fU On ^ m *
Livestock m OO ON ON NO r*'i — —' ^-'
rn * >>p (N r-; rNi ^ S "^ 9.
rn rn ^ ^ ^ _J
^^
—
' '
*t * «
u
Other Crops
* so
u-i 1 NO
i
in
NO
ID
00
* —
So
S5
9
£ r^ C!- ro —
-
o
u
B
W5 O vo 9 vO NO NO ^,^
£ :5 f^ -1 5; in
1
NO
ON
~: ?^ !£
Rice Farming 00 ON 00 r-; ?S ?S
t*« 1 s!_^ 1 s 1
o
o
u
w
J, e
* .—
.
* ^ ,
.a * \D * NO ^ ^ ^ ^
<n
-', a> ^ i NO (L> r^ 00 r^
Wage and Salary S? (U 00 "^ S- d d
^ V-) <^ <N
'"'
CN
^*^ ly-i •'.^ NO
* .^—
.
^ Co * \D NO NO ^^^ , ,
i J, ^ i <u li 00 rg —
Business Profits :SS <u — ON — — ^^
-^ (N ° £. ° 9
_; <^ p ^ ""
-
oo 1- a, .t; 1- i:
= 3 / It
c
3
I—
— 4,
i« « >- Vsfo spon! redit
o « / > > U
!« / 4j -w -B J= f^ 2^ -a o^u4» ^ X
Regr
es
Wi
seliol
1 S
e «
=
>
,0
-= = £
> CLtu
!
.^ « 1
with
ragel dVF
/
Baseline
Only
Villag
Hou
egression
ositive
R(
nd
Villag
egression
bove
Ave
Value
an
/ H cs a. R ..
"^ ^^ r*" o
« >
(1> c->
3
•a
CO
«J
ITS ^
.— 3
Urn
X)
.2
a
i
.2
c (N
(0 CJ) "O
>
l/l r II
TOU
« u (U •^
H .a
L> crt
> a
0)
>ND
>
•a
3
>.
c 30 X)
r 2 « a
-1 c«
*^
T30 '? •ac
cd
c«
n uo
r j: >
a 1)
HJ XI <D
C3X
ii» a u.
-T-l 3 N > ..
a C
2:dj <U 0)
'
0/1 A
(0 ^
w >
n c > ca ??
a 1) Q.X A
a c3 n -g
-^
.S.S S8
u n u -n lU
>r; Ofl ra r:\
'—
'
u c u
T3 "5 Oi) -0 £
>
X to
>
n.
CJ "p; 1/3
(1)^ t* n
11) l/l C4. i»
M
3 fa =
Oil
^ "~" , aj <«
T3 C 03
C 3 Kj »j CO
33 n
~n n
O" k-
tj3 OJ
C/5 a a '5 X)
* S ra 1?p
..
n
u
rrt
0)
00
0 c/) c
C/}
-a
cc "3
> X>
.2
u
c
V5
c X)
C3
>
a
a
-n S^ -a
« Cm n
1> u u 3
-n a
t;:: 0. 01) 3
0
3j
-a
'A
-a
4) -5
c 3
ty) OJ .:«: _2 Q. U
* (^ (IJ ^—
* H > U H—
,5
s
c
o
u
S
*( ^
u * r^i rq rj F^ ^«
Ol ir^ U-1 Of o O O
5 O OP d d d ° 2o ^^ ^-^
Constr.
Outside
County
"^ ^ ;^ ^ ??
ON §1 §§
? 2. ^ 2-
1^ = !•„
— — M — oT r^ rj ?r, ??
— o oo o is
d 2al^ m
o o
^ 2.
c
,o J
c
s
u
u
o
General
Non-Agri 11 II
d 2
0.0005** (0.0002)
>-,
X!
3
„ 3 t^ S3 ss
. o O O o
DD |i ro P o9 o 29 £ 29 2-O
„
W pi r^ — <"' r'l <NO
%.% §§ou
<u ? 2. 9 d ^ 2-s
2
__
-^
__
~.
ON S o 2 2MD 2 o
u o P o 2 2
tl.
C-1 o d 9 2 9 2
Ol
u
3 * '—
-
* ^
— r^ r- "* (N —r^
° o
o d
3 ^~*
9 SOij 9' —
-<
/ c«
^r C
^ « /^
.2 s .*w
= -^ /
>
_o 3 3
=
.5 /
V] j= t« JS w
21^ /
/ - o II ll
y' E"
o ^= V3 ..00^
u
u 4)
u _
0J3
^5^'
/ ^
CO
O' u/ s b: u./ H 3z
3 !U 1*
, 00 —
3 <N
13 —
-e ii s
13
-r-
TO *-- ._
O J= -^
D ra oj
^ Wl tn
3 a
-n 03
CJ f/i >
a> flJ
3
>
<-^
^ CJ
T3
•^ S2 R
-0
c
-d
OJ
HJ afl (i>
a c
3
c u yl
> j=
^ a.)
,_, c-^
ra OJ
rt "T;
-0
c
CJJ rt
—
"^ s =
oN. « -a ^
»y-l > cd C
o <u
60 C
H
o
-C
»> 2 -d
<^ o 2
'^ S 5o tS >
2
"o
3
O
X
•73
V
t3^
c
e
o
B
o
c
3
B
O
U
a
B
03
»3
a>
w
k.
3
O
o
u
B
B
O
T3
HI
V.
U
3
6X1
>
Cm
O
*-
U
B
00
e
o
3
o
u
B
u
c
o
c
E
o
u
a.
X CC
<
o &>
II
c
"3
u
3
•a
4> f~,
re s iS
> re re
s G
n
u
» c
— >o
o o
o o
9 o
o
m r<-iO O
d d
O
° o
in ^^
On *
OO
M ^ 2
aj DJ3 3
- « o
= = a:
a;
-C
ea ^
m oo ^
o o
d d
9 d
* (N
11
O O
d d
t^ o
o o
d d
vq oo
<
ex
c
C/5
3
C. «
o =
*
_rSo
O O
d d
n d
S9
d 2.
O O
* (N
o o
.2 O
tC
S§
9 o
9 o
9 d
o
o o
d d
9 o
9 o
9 d
o ^9 o
9 d
o o
"" d
1- u .t:
.2 =
~
> > u
= = i
C 9i &
.2 * ^
«J o c
C£ 0. R
o o
o o
d d
9 d
9 d
* ^
— o
"^ do ^^
* vo
•n o
" do -^
9 o
9 d
o o
~. d
5 3 -
>Q
a. 1;
?
11
r 1
OS ^
—
^ ^3 aj a
.2 > re
^ "^ a>
4> 4, _3
eig «
c t
n
VI
CO
fc
o
,
. n o
rt
-a
x:
o Lw re
«>
o JZ .^
i^
-a
nj
Xl u re
c o (NO
c o
^
re
>
M
u ll
re
E
c
F
re
u
+-
3 re <Rn
re
o
r:
re
a) H 1-re
.C5 >
E ai- >>3 re
C ~ 3
>-. > 3
H c o
n r/l re
n •n
T3 o .ti
-n x: ?
o -a
"u
3
o
3
o
JS
o
o XI u
•a
re
c3 Vl
-3
VI
00
re
re
> >
^ (U
in
_aj a
>
a o
re 0>
"O
ri
sS
<*-
o re
n> 0/1 «j
-a c ^
(ij
><' VI
c X
•r) u
u O V) '*-
>
(1>
o
t/i VI
3
O re 3
>N VI
M a
(I)
3
OJ
r, re
rvl 3
'c
3
re
VI
O
Vi
3
ffl
*
OJ
,2
re <]i 73
~
re
a
re
>
_0J
re
a
c
re
(LIX
i-
;^ i •n
m > re -4—1
rt
^ X T3
t+^
r; •o o
r3 S
OX)
re
-o
1^
.R
Si)
-o VI
-a
O) (D j^ re
* .2 t*- -^
* H o >
